'Cooperation on a purely matter-of-fact basis'. The Norwegian central bank and its relationship to the German supervisory authority during the occupation, 1940-1945. The financial and economic contribution of occupied countries to the German war economy1939-1945 has recently attracted interest among economic historians. New calculations by Klemann and Kydruashov show that the occupied countries contributed a significant part of the total German war costs, between 25 and 30 percent. According to their calculations the Norwegian contribution was between six and seven percent of the total contribution of occupied countries. This is higher than in earlier estimates. Per capita, Norway contributed twice the average of the occupied western European countries and 50 percent more than the Netherlands.
1 This paper explains the reasons behind the large Norwegian contribution by focussing on the institutional arrangements of financial transfers. Thus the paper provides new dimensions on how German financial occupation policies varied in different countries according to varying circumstances. This is one important aspect in understanding the German war economy. The large Norwegian contribution is also interesting considering the swift Norwegian economic recovery after liberation. Because the financial contribution was totally dominated by the German withdrawals from the Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank (NB), the paper focuses on the role of NB and its relationship with the German monetary supervisory authority during the occupation and more generally on the institutional mechanisms and arrangements for financial transfers.
A main finding is that accommodating strategies and policies characterised NB from the first weeks of the occupation to a greater extent than the central banks in the other occupied western European countries, notably in Belgium and the Netherlands. printing press, to the German war economy. The paper thus also contributes to the debate on central bank independence, which is dominated by research on the period after 1945 and which seldom considers the effects of war, much less occupation. 3 The agency of central banks during the German occupation in World War II was to a large extent decided by the initial reactions of the banks and other domestic decision makers to the occupant.
The paper is based on the archives of NB and the remaining files of Reichskommissariat's monetary supervisor together with other unpublished and printed sources, which have been scarcely used in previous research. The institutional arrangements for the financial transfers in 2 van der Wee/Verbreyt,'small nation'(2009), Vanthoor, ' King's eldest daughter ' (2005) . 3 Crowe/Meade, 'Evolution' (2007), Cuikerman, Central Bank (1992) . A longer historical perspective is provided in Tonioli, Central bank (1988) .
Norway are compared to those of other countries in Western Europe, particularly Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark.
The paper first presents the main elements of how Norway financed its occupation and its monetary consequences, followed by a presentation the basic governance structure in occupied Norway and Reichskommissariat's principle of indirect rule. The third section deals with Norway's relative position within Germany's war financing system followed by a section on the foundations of the particular relationship between NB and
Reichskommissariat's supervisory authority. The subsequent sections discuss NB's secrecy regarding monetary figures, strategies for limiting the German withdrawals, NB's governor Nicolai Rygg's contemplations on resigning, cooperation between NB and
Reichskommissariat on the issues of inflation and nazification. The final section presents some conclusions.
Occupation financing and its monetary consequences
The official reports from Statistics Norway and NB on the occupation economy in 1945 and 1946 have not been supplemented or replaced by extensive research. Most historians now agree that the total costs of the war and the damages to the economy were exaggerated in these publications. The size of the financial transactions with the Germans has been subject to less debate. They were totally dominated by the net German withdrawals on NB's occupation account, amounting to a total of NOK 11 billion. Norway had a surplus on the clearing account with Germany of about NOK 500 million. German confiscations of private property amounted to NOK 1200 million, most of which was compensated by the central government during the occupation. Confiscations of state property worth NOK 600 million, mainly comprising provisions and materiel from the armed forces after the campaign in 1940, came in addition but had no financial consequences during the occupation.
4 Table 1 about here The state financed about NOK 2 billion of these expenses through rapidly increasing taxes and duties during the occupation and NOK 2 billion through bonds. The remainder of about NOK 8 billion was financed by NB's note printing. This led to a rapid increase in the money supply. To limit the inflationary pressures created by the extensive use of the printing press, and to facilitate banks' payment of interest on all deposits, Treasury bills were introduced in 1941. The amount of Treasury bills sold, mostly to banks, had increased to NOK 3 billion in May 1945, see table 1. The proceeds from the Treasury bills were placed in a special account in NB sterilising a share of the increase in the money supply. In April 1945, the total assets of commercial banks and saving banks came to NOK 8 155 million, of which NOK 5 161 million (63%) were held as call deposits in NB, Treasury bills or government bonds. 5 The amount and profile of the state payments on the occupation account, increasing sharply from 1942, was decided by the Germans.
The development of governance structures and Terboven's principle of indirect rule
When Germany invaded Norway on 9 April 1940 the ministers of the Nygaardsvoldgovernment evacuated the capital and eventually went into exile in London in June 1940. On the evening on April 9, Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the small Norwegian Nazi party, Nasjonal Samling(NS) executed a coup d'état in Oslo supported by the Germans.
Quisling made a failed attempt to establish a functioning "national" government under an 4 SSB, 'NOS X 102 ' (1946) , 161 ff. 5 ), 66-69, 124, SSB,'Statistisk-økonomisk utsyn' (1945 
Norway's distinct position within Germany's system of war financing
The central banks in occupied countries had two main functions in the German war financing system. Occupation payments were largely financed either directly by the central bank, as in Norway and Denmark, or by the state as in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, through borrowing in the central bank, which had to engage in extensive note printing in both cases.
Payments were technically made through the system of Reichskreditkassenscheine (RKKS), which the German authorities declared legal tender on an equal footing with the domestic currency shortly after invading a country. The RKKS, printed by the Reichsbank, was a kind of cash credit voucher denominated in Reichsmark. RKKS were used by the Wehrmacht as a means of payment and as legal tender in occupied territories only. 18 The circulation of RKKS could be a serious threat to the monetary system of the occupied countries. In most occupied western European countries, the central bank thus attempted in different ways to stop the 16 Hirschfeld, 'Nazi Rule' (1988 ), ch.4, Emmendörfer, 'Geld-und Kreditaufsicht' (1957 Norwegian exports to Germany, as in the case of other occupied countries, was significantly larger than official trade statistics show through unregistered deliveries to the Wehrmacht. 
4.The foundations of the special relationship between NB and Sattler
On 29 April 1940 Sattler met NB's governor Rygg at NB's head office for the first time.
Sattler, in sharp contrast to the often arrogant behaviour of other German officers and officials in Oslo, came alone and adhered to the traditional German bureaucratic etiquette of politeness and correctness. Sattler humbly asked for necessary information and offered "cooperation on a purely matter-of-fact basis", while stressing that he was not a Nazi. He agreed with NB's policy of keeping business and the economy going as well as possible and "maintaining the 29 Scherner, 'Importboom' (2012), Scherner, 'Europas Beitrag' (2012a) . 30 Buchheim, 'Länder' (1986 , Aly, 'Hitler's beneficiaries' (2007 Sandberg, 'Min konstitusjon' (1943 /45?), 43-44, GJD 1940 , 305-306, Finans-og tolldepartementet, 'Innstilling' (1948 , 58. 53 The obvious exception was a clandestine operation described in Sønsteby, 'Rapport' (2010), 78-80, 270-373. were made public and, at least in the case of Denmark, the export surplus on its clearing accounts with Germany financed by Nationalbanken was published. 1940, 307-308, ibid. 1941,1-2, 70-71, ibid. 1942, 2, 101-102, ibid. 1945, preface. the money supply. Nazi Germany stood to gain most from shrouding its withdrawals from NB in secrecy.
Greater transparency about the withdrawals could have been politically damaging to Germany and not least the Quisling-regime which portrayed itself as the guardian of national interest.
6.Limits on the German withdrawals from NB?
NB and the Administrative Council had expected that the blank cheque handed over to the The most interesting part of the commission's report was the alternatives presented to reduce the net withdrawals through various changes in bookkeeping that in effect would shift financing of costs from NB and Norway to Germany. Sattler had proposed all these alternatives to the commission. The explicit aim was to "secure the continued voluntary cooperation of the influential Norwegians in Norges Bank". 79 One of the alternatives was to set a specific maximum amount that could be withdrawn from NB per month. Such a This included fuel for German naval warfare against the allies and locomotives used to transport supplies on Norwegian railways to the German forces on the Russian front. From
April 1941 all products imported direct from Germany for the Wehrmacht's use in Norway were in principle to be excluded from the Norwegian-German clearing system. The aim was to reduce the use of NOK withdrawn from NB because all products imported from Germany 78 Ibid., 81-82. 79 Ibid.,73-81 citation 80, Norges Bank, 'Norges Bank' (1945), 38 ff. 80 Norges Bank, 'Norges Bank' (1945), 50, 125-126. to the Wehrmacht within the clearing regime would in effect be paid for by withdrawals from NB. 81 time Rygg considered resigning, but everyone he consulted "argued against such a step". 85 The Administrative Council's decision to appoint Jahn as an extraordinary board member a few days prior to Terboven's dismissal implied that the council wanted NB's board of directors to continue their work.
86
On 19 May 1941, ten days prior to the subsequent crisis, the board of directors made their only written evaluation of the matter. Resignation had been discussed several times. The "crucial factor" was whether a resignation would "serve the interests of the bank and the country". In the discussions "serious doubts" had been raised with regard to such a step and the board of directors refrained. "One feared" that a resignation could have "unfortunate consequences" by "further weakening confidence in our monetary system", as well as creating "also in other ways greater confusion". It was emphasised that if a resignation was considered "appropriate" it should be collective one. 87 After NB had accepted the increase in German withdrawals from late May 1941, Rygg again put the matter to the board prior to a meeting of the board of representatives on 9 September 1941. The discussion was influenced by the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 23 June and the rapid German advance into Russia. The same was true of Terboven's swift and tough response to the protests from numerous professional organisations against the attempts to nazify Norwegian society in May-June 1941. 88 According to Rygg's notes from the discussion, the conclusion was more or less identical to the records from May, but the arguments against were more outspoken. Shipowner Arthur H. Mathiesen voiced the opinion that a resignation would only make matters "very much worse". Jahn "agreed". Thorkildsen was "particularly afraid of the panic it would create." 89 On 9 September the board of representatives "unanimously expressed" its wish that the "board of directors should continue in their positions". 90 This was a unique vote of confidence during the occupation from NB's supreme body.
91
The last time it can be documented that Rygg considered resigning was at the end of January 1942. On 28 February 1942 Rygg would be 70 years old, which was the normal retirement age for senior officials in Norway. A mandatory retirement age for the governor and his deputy was not specified, however. His predecessor had resigned at the age of 78. Rygg Norwegian business to the Wehrmacht would continue to be significantly above the average of occupied countries.
Cooperation against inflation and nazification
There were few serious clashes with the Reichskommissariat concerning the size of German withdrawals and other monetary matters after 1941. 95 From 1942 German withdrawals were stabilised at a level lower than the large withdrawals in 1941. The numerous measures to control the economy, including an ever more extensive system of rationing and price 94 Vea, 'Naeringsliv' (1974) , 169 with reference to Generalbericht der Hauptabteilung Volkswirtschaft 1940 -1942 On the exception to the rule, see ), 62, Vogt/Hartmann, 'Akten' (1958 ), 139-146, Milward, 'Fascist economy' (1972 regulations and controls, reduced official inflation to fairly low levels compared with the first 12 to 15 months of the occupation, without creating as large black markets as in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. NB's main contribution, in cooperation with the Reichskommissariat, was to maintain public confidence in the value of NOK. The increasing surplus liquidity among firms and households was to a large extent held as bank deposits, which the banks invested in long-term governmental bonds and in short-term Treasury bills.
This made it possible for the banks to offer a low but seemingly adequate interest rate on these deposits. of government bonds issued prior to war were priced somewhat higher than government bonds issued during the occupation. The political risk reflected in government bond prices 96 Sandberg, 'Min konstitusjon' (1943/45), 106. during the occupation compared with pre-war bonds could not be considered significant, of directors not to resign was not deemed heroic, it "had to be accepted", the majority of the investigating committee concluded. The committee's overall conclusion was more positive.
Those responsible at NB had done their best to defend national interests and maintain the credibility of the monetary system, for which it deserved "recognition". 
